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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no other single facet of estate planning has been so plagued
by misunderstanding and ignorance as that part concerned with the con-
current ownership of property. Whether attributable to the desire to
avoid probate and the claims of creditors, or to the erroneous belief that
jointly held property will pass on the death of one of the tenants to the
survivor outside the grasp of the federal government, the device of joint
ownership is considerably more widespread than sound planning dictates.
Although it is true that owning property jointly will enable the first co-
owner who dies to avoid the inclusion of the property in his probate
estate and though it may in certain cases provide insulation against the
claims of one's personal creditors, the estate and gift tax consequences
of this form of ownership are often so adverse that in the absence of ex-
tremely compelling non-tax reasons an alternative form of ownership
should be given serious consideration.
Concurrent ownership in real or personal property may assume
one of three forms. Title may be held in joint tenancy, whereby each
joint tenant is deemed to own an undivided interest in the whole property
with a right of survivorship. In order to create the traditional joint ten-
ancy, each tenant must hold the property pursuant to the four so-called
"unities" of time, title, interest and possession.' The destruction of any one
* Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review; Student Assistant in Instruction
for Freshmen, University of Miami School of Law.
1. See generally MOYNIHAN, REAL PROPERTY 129 (1940); 4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
§ 615 (1954) ; 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §§ 1775, 1777 (1961) ; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROP-
ERTY § 418 (1939).
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of the unities results in the termination of a joint tenancy. This will take
place when the joint tenants join in a conveyance of the property to a
third person; when the tenants, acting jointly, sever the tenancy in favor
of a tenancy in common; or when either tenant, acting alone, alienates his
interest to a third person.2 Although at the common law the right of
survivorship was inalienable either by an inter vivos transfer or by
will,' the unilateral conveyance by one joint tenant of his undivided in-
It is not necessary that the words "joint tenancy" or "as joint tenants" be used in
order to create such an estate; any expression clearly disclosing an intent to create a joint
tenancy is sufficient. Thus, the use of words of survivorship alone, without reference to the
existence of a joint ownership relationship, will suffice to create a joint tenancy. See, e.g.,
Peters v. Alsup, 95 F. Supp. 684 (D. Hawaii 1951) (survivor of the settlors of a trust to
have a life estate and power to appoint the remainder held to be a joint tenancy); Finch
v. Haynes, 144 Mich. 352, 107 N.W. 910 (1906) (to A and B or the survivor of them);
Schwab v. Schwab, 280 App. Div. 139, 122 N.Y.S.2d. 354 (1952) ("the parties .of the second
part, their heirs and assigns forever" in granting and habendum clauses indicated a concept
of survivorship not repugnant to an introductory designation as "joint tenants").
At the common law, joint tenancies were favored over tenancies in common because
the feudal system was opposed to the division of tenures. Consequently, a conveyance
to two or more persons, without more, was presumed to be a joint tenancy. In order to
create a tenancy in common it was necessary that there be something to show the intent
that the grantees or devisees were to hold by several and distinct titles, or that instead of
survivorship in one, there should be a right of inheritance from the tenants individually.
See 4 THOMpSON, op. cit. supra at § 1775. Today, the common law presumption has been
reversed, and by statute in many states a conveyance of property simply "to A and B" is
presumptively a tenancy in common. For an example of a statute of this sort, see FLA. STAT.
§ 689.15 (1963).
Under the common law doctrine of the "unities," a person could not create a joint
tenancy between himself and another in property he already owned without first conveying
it through a "straw." This was necessary because in a direct conveyance from A to A and B
the unity of time would be absent, since A would have acquired his interest in the property
earlier than B. Where the common law rule is still honored, the parties will be deemed to
hold the property as tenants in common without the right of survivorship. Dolley v. Powers,
404 Ill. 510, 89 N.E.2d 412 (1950) ; Price v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 294 Mich. 289,
293 N.W. 652 (1940); Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716, 32 N.W.2d 271 (1948) (created a
tenancy in common with a "supplementary" right of survivorship). Other jurisdictions no
longer require strict compliance with the "unities" requirement, finding it to be an anach-
ronism of the common law. See Switzer v. Pratt, 237 Iowa 788, 23 N.W.2d 837 (1946);
Therrien v. Therrien, 94 N.H. 66, 46 A.2d 538 (1946). See also 4 POWELL, op. cit. supra at
§ 616.
In most states, however, including Florida, the four "unities" are required both for the
creation and continuance of a joint tenancy. Weed v. Knox, 157 Fla. 876, 27 So.2d 419
(1946). For a definition of each of the "unities" and what is required thereunder, see 2
TnFANY, op. cit. supra at § 418.
Joint tenancies may be created in community property states between husband and
wife. However, the interests of the spouses are not community property in that they are
separate property not subject to distribution by the courts upon divorce. Collier v. Collier,
73 Ariz. 405, 242 P.2d 537 (1952); Barba v. Barba, 103 Cal. App. 2d 395, 229 P.2d 465
(1951). Further, a joint tenancy may be created by a husband a wife out of their com-
munity property. Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781 (1952).
2. See generally MovNinAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 131; 4 THomPsoN, op. cit. supra
note 1, at § 1780; 2 Tn rANY, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 425.
3. 4 THompsor, op. cit. supra note 1, at §§ 1779, 1781. Nor can there be dower or
curtesy in an estate held in joint tenancy, because the right of survivorship takes precedence
over a marital interest in the estate. Mayburry v. Brien, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 21 (1841) ; Bab-
bitt v. Day, 41 N.J. Eq. 392, 5 Atl. 275 (1886); Turner v. Turner, 185 Va. 505, 39 S.E.2d
299 (1946).
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terest to a third person resulted in the destruction of the right of sur-
vivorship in the non-transferring joint tenant.
A joint tenancy is -to be distinguished from a tenancy by the entirety,
which at the common law was essentially a joint tenancy modified by the
fiction that husband and wife were but one person. Thus, the unity of
marriage was added to the original four unities in order to give rise to a
tenancy by the entirety.4 In theory, each spouse was seised of the whole
interest and not of a share, as opposed to joint tenants, who were said to
be seised of a share and of the whole.' As a result of that conceptual dis-
tinction, the rule developed that the right of survivorship of one tenant
by the entirety could not be defeated by unilateral action on the part
of either tenant. Although the common law tenancy by the entirety has
been abolished in a number of American jurisdictions and modified in
many respects where it still exists, nevertheless the majority of states
which do recognize it prohibit the destruction of the right of survivorship
by either spouse acting alone. 6
The doctrine of survivorship appears to have resulted from the theory that joint tenants
together own a single estate. See the discussion in note 5 infra. If this theory were carried
out and rigidly applied, it would recognize no distinct interest in a person which would
pass on his death to his heirs or devisees. 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 419.
4. As Bracton noted, "Vir et exor sunt quasi unica persona quia caro una et sanguis unus"
--"the husband and wife are, as it were, one person, because only one flesh and blood."
BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951). Blackstone also recognized that "to the four unities
of a joint tenancy therefore is added the unity of husband and wife as a person in the
law." 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *182. See also, generally, 4 POWELL, Op. cit. supra note
1, at § 620; 4 THoMPsON, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 1784.
In Florida, the legislature has authorized a direct conveyance between husband and
wife for the purpose of creating a tenancy by the entirety. FLA. STAT. § 689.11 (1963). See
also BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 440-44 (1964).
5. Blackstone explained that the joint tenancy differed from the tenancy by the en-
tirety in that according to the latter, the parties held per tout et non per my-that is, each
held all but neither held a share. Consequently, neither could dispose of his part without
the other's consent. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *182.
Under this theory, neither spouse in the tenancy by the entirety situation has any
individual portion which can be alienated or separated, or reached by the creditors of either
spouse. 4 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 1784. The survivor takes no new title by
virtue of survivorship, but rather, he holds under the deed by virtue of which he was
originally seised of the whole. 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 419.
It is said that the surviving joint tenant takes the whole of the estate by survivorship,
rather than by descent. According to one theory, nothing passes to the surviving tenant on
the death of one joint tenant, but rather, since ownership and possession was per tout the
survivor continues as owner of the whole. It is easy to see that a literal application of that
concept would turn the Internal Revenue Code upside down, since there would be no "trans-
fer" subject to the estate tax under § 2040 upon the death of one joint tenant, nor would
an interest "pass" to the surviving spouse for purposes of the marital deduction under
§ 2056.
For a thorough review of the tenancy by the entirety, see the case of King v. Greene,
30 N.J. 395, 153 A.2d 49 (1959).
6. E.g., Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925) ; Marble v. Jackson, 245 Mass.
504, 139 N.E. 422 (1923); Lopez v. McQuade, 151 Misc. 390, 273 N.Y. Supp. 34 (Sup. Ct.
1934). See also 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6 (Casner ed. 1952).
However, the prohibition applies only to unilateral destructions of the right of sur-
vivorship. Thus, the tenancy by the entirety may be terminated by the husband and wife
joining together in a conveyance of the property to a third person. Maxwell v. Sullivan,
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The final species of concurrent ownership is -the tenancy in com-
mon, which resembles in many ways a joint tenancy without the right
of survivorship. This form of ownership permits either co-tenant to
freely alienate his one-half interest during his lifetime, much the same
as a joint tenant. However, upon the death of one tenant in common his
property will not pass to his co-tenant; rather, it will pass as his own prop-
erty to his heirs at law or as he has provided under his will. In addition to
its being created pursuant to the intentions of the parties, a tenancy in
common may also arise by operation of law upon the severance of a joint
tenancy.
7
123 Fla. 263, 166 So. 575 (1936). Moreover, whenever the unity of marriage is destroyed,
as by the death of a spouse or by divorce, the tenancy is terminated. In Florida, it is
recognized that divorce of the spouses will result in a termination of the tenancy. Valentine
v. Valentine, 45 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1950); Andrews v. Andrews, 155 Fla. 654, 21 So.2d 205
(1945). In such cases, the former husband and wife will continue to own the property as
tenants in common.
The divorce court will not award the property to one of the spouses without a finding
that some special equity existed. Holmes v. Holmes, 95 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1957) ; Jones v.
Jones, 121 So.2d. 811 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960); Latta v. Latta, 121 So.2d 42 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1960). But, the court may award the husband's interest to the wife as lump sum alimony.
Kilian v. Kilian, 97 So.2d 201 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957). This is not the case, however, when the
wife is an adulteress. Benson v. Benson, 102 So.2d 748 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
An interesting problem is posed when both spouses die in a common disaster, making
it impossible to determine which spouse survived the other. Some courts have held that
the property descends to the heirs of each as if it had been held by the spouses as tenants
in common. McGhee v. Henry, 144 Tenn. 548, 234 S.W. 509 (1921). However, if it can be
shown that one of the spouses, usually the husband, furnished the entire consideration for
the purchase of the property, it will descend to his heirs alone. In re Strong's Will, 171
Misc. 445, 12 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sur. Ct. 1939). The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act provides
in effect that when there is no evidence of which joint tenant or tenant by the entirety sur-
vived the other, then the property will descend as if it had been held by them as tenants
in common. UNn'oRm SlMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT § 3, adopted in Florida in FLA. STAT.
§ 736.05 (1963). This problem is the subject of a brief annotation in 18 A.L.R. 105 (1922).
For a comprehensive and illuminating analysis of the traditional and modern joint
tenancy and tenancy by the entirety in the United States, see Comment, 61 MIc. L. REV.
1335 (1963).
7. Although in many respects a tenancy in common seems to be first cousin to the
joint tenancy absent the survivorship feature, they are in theory quite distinct. A tenancy in
common, technically, is not an estate, but rather, it is a relationship between persons. The
only "unity" which exists is the unity of possession; hence, remaindermen cannot be said
to hold as tenants in common until they have a right to present possession. See 4 THOMPSON,
op. cit. supra note 1, at § 1793.
Since each tenant in common holds his title independent of the other, his interest may
be alienated freely, or devised and encumbered without the need for the consent of his
co-tenant. Moreover, each tenant in common has an equal right to the use and occupation
of the property, provided he does not use it in such a way as to exclude the other tenants
from enjoying their equal privileges. Ibid.
When there are three joint tenants and one of them conveys his undivided one-third
interest, the two remaining joint tenants hold their undivided two-thirds in joint tenancy
with one another; together, they are tenants in common with the transferee of the trans-
ferring joint tenant, in the ratio of two-thirds to one-third, respectively. When one of the
non-transferring joint tenants dies, the survivor succeeds to a two-thirds interest as tenant
in common with the transferee. Jackson v. O'Connell, 23 Ill. 2d 52, 177 N.E.2d 194 (1961).
For a discussion of the characteristics of a tenancy in common and the attendant rights
of the co-owners, see also MoYNrIAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 131; 2 TiFFANY, op. cit. supra
note 1, at § 425.
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As will be seen shortly, the gift tax consequences of holding prop-
erty in joint ownership will differ according to the form of concurrent
ownership used. Consequently, the planner is wise to ascertain the law
of property which prevails in the local jurisdiction before proceeding
to recommend a specific form of co-ownership.
II. FEDERAL ESTATE TAx-A BRIEF WARNING
In order to place the gift taxation of jointly-held property in its proper
setting, a few words should be said about the estate tax consequences
associated with this form of ownership. The basic estate tax rule is
furnished by section 2040 of the 1954 Code, which provides that the
gross estate of a decedent shall include for the purposes of the federal
estate tax the value of all property in which the decedent owned an in-
terest at his death as a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety. This amount
is diminished by ;the amount of consideration shown to have been fur-
nished by the surviving spouse or other joint tenant for the creation of, or
additions in value to, such tenancy.
The burden of proving consideration, however, rests on the shoulders
of the decedent's estate, and as a practical matter has proven to be vir-
tually insurmountable.' One can but speculate at the surprise experienced
by a husband who, thinking he has found the estate planner's panacea
in the joint ownership device, discovers that not only is the value of the
property includible in the gross estate of his deceased wife, but also that
he is unable to prove that he had, in actuality, furnished the entire con-
sideration for the purchase of the property. Nothwithstanding the normal
realities of such a situation, presumptions have not been entertained
in favor of the husband's contribution. Even when the husband is the
first of the spouses to die, the inclusion of all jointly owned property in his
gross estate is often a consequence totally unintended. Although some re-
lief is granted by the availability of the estate tax marital deduction,9 usu-
ally it is not sufficient in itself to render the joint form of ownership de-
sirable, since an outright devise or bequest to the surviving spouse would
be entitled to the same treatment.
If section 2040 lurks as a trap for the unsuspecting taxpayer, the gift
tax consequences associated with joint ownership emerge to add painful
insult to the injury. The remainder of this article will be devoted to the
exploration of those consequences.
III. PRE-1955 LAW-THE UNKNOWN SNARE
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 made no specific reference to gift
taxation of jointly-held property. Nevertheless, by case law the federal
8. For a discussion of the problems involved in tracing payments of consideration, see
Laikin, Joint Ownership and Tax Planning, 42 MARQ. L. REV. 176 (1959).
9. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
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gift tax was applied to transfers of separate property into joint tenancy
with another.'0 Since no provisions in the Code could be singled out to
justify the imposition of a gift tax, the courts relied upon the property law
concepts, which had controlled the estate tax, in holding that a taxable gift
was made to the extent that one of the tenants made a gratuitous transfer
of an interest in the property to the other."
The amount of the gift was determined to be the difference between
the consideration furnished for the creation of the tenancy and the value
of the rights the donor had retained in the property.' In this respect,
the differences under the governing local law between a joint tenancy and
tenancy by the entirety became crucial. In the case of a joint tenancy,
the donor's retained interest in the property was always equal to one-
half its value, on the basis that each tenant acting alone could sever the
tenancy inter vivos, entitling himself to one-half the property. Conse-
quently, the value of the gift to the donee joint tenant was also equal to
one-half the value of the property. On the other hand, in the case of a ten-
ancy by the entirety, the value of the donor's retained interest varied ac-
cording to the relative ages of the spouses. Because neither tenant, acting
alone, could sever the tenancy, the value of a tenant by the entirety's re-
tained interest depended on the probability that he would outlive his co-
owner and survive to the entire property. For this reason, it was necessary
to resort to actuarial tables' 8 relating the life expectancies of the spouses.
Not only did a gift arise on the creation of a joint tenancy or tenancy
by the entirety, but any additions to the value of the tenancy or reductions
in indebtedness thereon would result in a second gift to the extent that
10 Lilly v. Smith, 96 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 604, rehearing
denied, 307 U.S. 651 (1939); Gutman, 41 B.T.A. 816 (1940). The imposition of gift tax
liability on the creation of a tenancy by the entirety was upheld under the law prior to
1954 despite the fact that the entire property was subject to an estate tax on the donor's
death. Commissioner v. Hart, 106 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1939). Nor was the value of the gift
reduced by the value of the widow's dower interest in the property. Hopkins v. Magruder,
34 F. Supp. 381, aff'd, 122 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1941); Correlia M. Thompson, 37 B.T.A. 793
(1938).
See also LowNDEs & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 658-59 (2d ed. 1962);
4 RABKIN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, Gnr AND ESTATE TAXATION § 51.07 (1964); Bern-
stein, Tax Dangers in Estates by the Entirety, 1 MIAMI L.Q. 86, 93-94 (1947).
11. See Kimbrough, State and Federal Taxation, 93 TRUSTS & ESTATES 904 (1954). The
taxable event occurred at the moment that control was transferred from the donor to the
donee. Thus, when a husband paid the full purchase price for a conveyance of property to
himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety or as joint tenants, his power over part of
the whole title was considered definitely to have been destroyed by the conveyance. It was
this shift in control which marked the appropriate event for the imposition of the gift tax.
See 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Gr TAXATION 1100 (1942); Knecht, Correcting Joint
Property Evils, 93 TRUSTS & ESTATES 8 (1954).
12. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.19(h). For a comprehensive treatment of the pre-1955 law,
see Kimbrough, State and Federal Taxation, 93 TRUSTS & ESTATES 904 (1954); Knecht, Cor-
recting Joint Property Evils, 93 TRUSTS & ESTATES 8 (1954). See also MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL
TAXES 21.77 (38th ed. 1961).
13. Prior to 1952, these tables could be found in Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.2(a)(6) and
86.19(f)-(h).
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the consideration furnished by one of the spouses exceeded his retained
interest in the property.
14
Finally, under the pre-1955 law, a third gift was likely to arise on the
termination of a tenancy whenever the proceeds of termination were re-
ceived in a manner disproportionate to the interests of the tenants in the
property. Thus, if joint tenants were to sell the property and distribute
the proceeds, a gift would arise to the extent that one tenant received more
than one-half the proceeds. A similar result would obtain on .the termina-
tion of a tenancy by the entirety; in this case, however, the amount of the
gift would be determined by use of the actuarially-computed retained
interests of the spouses.
The gift tax rules prior to 1955 were applicable regardless of
whether the property was real or personal. In two areas, however, special
treatment was accorded. First, the creation of a joint bank account did not
in itself give rise to a gift from the person furnishing the consideration for
the account. In the case of a joint bank account (or a similar type of
ownership wherein the person furnishing the consideration might regain
the entire property without his co-owner's consent), the Regulations 5
provided that a gif~t would arise only at such time as the donee drew upon
the account for his own benefit. In that event, a gift would result to the
extent of the amount withdrawn. 6
The second exception to the general gift tax rules was accorded to a
person who purchased United States savings bonds with his separate
property and took title thereto in joint names. In such cases, no gift
arose until the donor, during his lifetime, permitted the donee to redeem
the bonds and retain the proceeds of his or her separate property. In that
event, a gift of the then redemption value of the bonds would be made.'"
14 The earlier gift tax regulations did not deal specifically with the valuation of a
transfer of property held in joint tenancy or by the entirety to sole ownership of one of
the tenants. However, Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.2(a)(6) prescribed the method of valuing the
interest which passed to the wife when her husband used separate property for a purchase
in both names as tenants by the entirety. Hence, it would seem that when the property is
transferred to the wife's sole ownership, the gift would be measured by the computed value of
the husband's retained rights at the time of the transfer, since that is what he has given
up at that time. The value of his retained rights would depend on the attained ages of the
husband and wife at the time of the transfer. See Ekman, Tax Consequences of Tenancies
by the Entirety and Joint Tenancies, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX 291 (1955); Knecht,
supra note 12.
15. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.2(4). The same result is provided for under the present law.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4) (1958). This rule is consistent with the "transfer of con-
trol" standard which governs other forms of gifts. It is also consistent with the rules gov-
erning other transfers of jointly-held property, rather than being an exception to those
rules.
16. However, in the case of withdrawal by the donee in order to purchase necessities
which the donor is obligated to furnish-such as money withdrawn to pay for household
expenses-no gift arises. See LowNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 10, at 666. If local
law treats the joint deposit as an irrevocable transfer to the donee, to the extent of one-half,
a gift arises at the creation of the account and not at the time of withdrawal. Ibid.
17. If the bonds were not redeemed during the lifetime of the donor, they would be
[VOL. XIX
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF JOINT OWNERSHIP
IV. SECTION 2515-A PARTIAL REPRIEVE
Despite the relative simplicity of the gift tax law concerning joint
ownership prior to 1955, one basic truth was painfully apparent: almost
without exception the taxpayer was oblivious to the law. Ignorant of the
fact that a gift tax might be payable following the creation of, addition
to or termination of a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety, taxpayers
with almost perfect unanimity neglected to file gift ,tax returns.'" In the
face of wholesale noncompliance, the Congress was impelled to take
action.
The legislative history of what later became section 2515 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 is scanty, and the reasons for its enactment
must be left, for the most part, to speculation. Probably the most power-
ful motivating force for its enactment was the fact that many couples had
elected-and probably would continue to elect-to purchase their homes
in joint ownership without the intention of making a gift at the -time of
purchase.' 9 Moreover, since transferee liability for the gift tax might arise
in the case of a transfer subsequent to the creation of a joint tenancy or
tenancy by ;the entirety, serious problems were presented for the title
searcher. Finally, as Joseph Trachtman remarked, it may have been the
intent of Congress to educate 'the public and thereby make "honest men
out of such unwitting tax violators."2 As it will be pointed out, however,
it is questionable whether the new provision has made the taxpayer any
more aware of his gift tax obligations, or whether it has merely postponed
his violation to a future date.
includible in his gross estate at their full redemption value. Mimeo No. 5202, 1941-2 Cum.
BULL. 241. The same result obtains under the present law. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4)
(1958).
If, however, a person purchases a United States savings bond and has it made payable
to himself or to a named beneficiary on his death, there is no taxable gift, since during his
lifetime the purchaser has not parted with the bond. Although there will be a transfer at
his death, it is dealt with by the estate tax. LOWNDES & KRAmER, Op. cit. supra note 10, at
667-68. Thus, once again the tax consequences are dictated by property law considerations
of "control."
18. See Ekman, supra note 14.
19. House Report, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4120-21 (1954):
Under present law the creation of a tenancy by the entirety may result in a gift
from one spouse to other [sic] at the time the tenancy is created. Moreover, the
termination of the tenancy may also constitute a gift unless the proceeds are divided
between the husband and wife. Frequently, real property is held in a tenancy by the
entirety to insure the right of survivorship in the surviving spouse. Many couples
who elect this method of buying a home have no intention of making a gift at the
time of the creation of the tenancy by the entirety or any knowledge that they are
considered as having done so. (Emphasis added.)
It is particularly noteworthy that all of the cases in which the imposition of the gift tax
was upheld prior to 1954 involved the creation of either a joint tenancy or tenancy by
the entirety in the family residence. See cases cited at note 10 supra.
20 TRACHTMAN, ESTATE PLANNING 176 (P.L.I. ed. 1964). But see Lawler, Joint Tenancy
and the Federal Estate Tax Law, 101 TRUsTs & ESTATES 1038, 1039 (1962): "In net effect,
Section 2515 merely replaced a gift tax 'sleeper' with a later and deeper 'sleeper.' "
1964]
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In substance, section 2515 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
provides the following:
(1) The creation of a tenancy by the entirety after December
31, 1954, in real property and between husband and wife, or the
additions in value thereto or reductions in indebtedness thereon,
will not be deemed a transfer subject to a gift tax regardless of
the proportion of consideration furnished by the spouses unless
the donor spouse elects to treat the transfer as a gift for federal
gift -tax purposes.2
(2) However, when there is a termination of the tenancy other
than by reason of the death of either spouse, and the donor
spouse did not elect to treat the creation of the tenancy as
a gift, then there will be a gift to the extent that the proceeds of
termination received by the spouses are not in exact proportion
to the consideration furnished by them during the existence of
the tenancy.2
(3) The election at the time of creation, or at the time of addi-
tions to value or reductions in indebtedness, to the extent that
such transfers will be treated as gifts, is made by filing a gift tax
return in the calendar year in which the creation of or additions
to the tenancy arose, regardless of whether the gift exceeds the
annual exclusion of section 2503(b). 3
(4) For purposes of section 2515, the term tenancy by the en-
tirety includes a joint tenancy with right of survivorship between
husband and wife.24
Before embarking on an exploration of the minute corners of section
2515, it is necessary to define its broad contours. By its terms, the stat-
ute is rendered operative only in the case of a tenancy by the en-
tirety or joint tenancy between husband and wife. Second, it applies only
to such tenancies created in real property. Finally, section 2515 is not
applicable unless the tenancy in realty between spouses has been created
after December 31, 1954. Thus, tenancies in personalty regardless of
the co-owners, tenancies in realty between non-spouses, tenancies in
21. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2515(a).
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2515(b). Termination of the tenancy by reason of the
death of one of the tenants is not treated as a termination, because any transfer at that
time would be testamentary in nature and taxed under the applicable estate tax provision
of section 2040. See LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 10, at 663.
23. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2515(c).
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2515(d). The original House version of the bill did not
include this provision. It was added by Senate Amendment No. 280, because:
Many states do not recognize a tenancy by the entirety but do allow husband and
wife to hold property as joint tenants with right of survivorship. In order to make
the benefits of this section applicable to all taxpayers, your committee has expanded
the House provisions to include joint tenancies in real property between husband
and wife with right of survivorship. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4762 (1954).
See also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 481 (1954), where the amendment to the
House bill is reported by the Senate.
[VOL. XlX
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF JOINT OWNERSHIP
realty between husband and wife created prior to 1955 and tenancies
in common-regardless of co-ownership, type of property or time of crea-
tion-will be subject to the prior law. 5
Inasmuch as the Code provides that a donor spouse may elect gift
tax consequences to be incurred upon the creation of a joint tenancy
or tenancy by the entirety, the over-all picture of multiple taxable events
still exists, at least as a possibility, and it thereby becomes necessary
to consider gift taxation at both the creation and termination of the ten-
ancy.
A. The Election Exercised-Gift on Creation of the Tenancy
As pointed out previously, prior to 1955 a gift arose on the creation
of a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety -to the extent the considera-
tion furnished by either spouse exceeded the value of -the rights retained
by that spouse. The most striking change wrought by the 1954 Code
lies in this area, for by virtue of section 2515(a) the creation of such
tenancies in reality gives rise to a taxable gift only in the event that
the donor elects to have it so treated. As the only significant difficul-
ties in this area concern the determination of the amount of consideration
furnished, the value of the donor's retained interest and the manner by
which the election is exercised, these will be discussed separately.
1. CONSIDERATION
In general, the consideration furnished by a person is the amount
contributed by him in connection with the creation of or additions in value
to a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety. Either spouse may furnish
the contribution, or it may be furnished by a third party; it may be
supplied in the form of money, other property or an interest in property.26
When the consideration is furnished in -the form of other property or an
interest in property, the amount of the contribution is equal to the fair
market value of the property at the time of the contribution, rather than
the transferor's cost or basis. 27 The same principle applies whether the
contributed property was the property transferred to husband and wife
jointly or was exchanged for the property held by husband and wife.
One area in which a problem is likely to arise-characterization of
consideration derived from third party sources-is clarified by the Regu-
25. An attempt was made to have the provisions of § 2515 apply to personal property
as well as to realty, but it was unsuccessful-apparently because a number of states do
not recognize a tenancy by the entirety in personal property. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CommiTTEE ON TAXATION, FIRsT REPORT ON H.R. 8300, at 73
(1954).
26. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(c)(1)(i) (1958). For a discussion of the allocation of
consideration under the Regulations, see Tomlinson, Gift Tax Aspects of Entireties, 98
TRUSTS & ESTATES 895 (1959) ; see also LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 10, at 661-62.
27 Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(c)(1)(i) (1958).
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lations. Whether consideration so derived is deemed to have been furn-
ished by the third person or by the spouses is made to depend on the
terms under which the transfer is made. Thus, if a decedent devises real
property to the spouses as tenants by the entirety, it is the decedent and
not the spouses who has furnished the consideration for the creation of
the tenancy. The same result obtains when the decedent by his will di-
rects his executor to discharge an indebtedness on the tenancy owned
by the spouses; in such event it is the decedent who has furnished
the consideration for -the addition in value. However, if the decedent has
bequeathed a general legacy to the spouses, which they in turn apply to
discharge an indebtedness, the spouses and not the decedent will be
treated as the persons who have furnished the consideration for the addi-
tions in value to the tenancy.28 The above principles are applicable
equally in the case of inter vivos transfers made by third persons.
Problems involving the attribution of consideration may also arise
when a tenancy is -terminated in part. This occurs when a portion of the
tenancy property is sold to a third party, or when the original property is
disposed of and in its place there is substituted other property of lesser
value acquired through reinvestment.2" In the event of a partial termina-
tion, the proportionate contribution of each co-owner to the remaining
tenancy will be generally the same as his proportionate contribution
to the original tenancy. Once these proportions are ascertained, they are
applied to the cost of the remaining or substituted property. Thus, if
property originally purchased for $100,000 by contributions from hus-
band and wife of $60,000 and $40,000 respectively, is sold for
$100,000, and $50,000 is reinvested in an identical tenancy, the considera-
tion for the new tenancy will be allocated $30,000 to the husband and
$20,000 to the wife. The Regulations8 ° provide an exception, however,
when it can be shown that a disproportionate part of the consideration
originally furnished was attributable to the fraction of the property sold.
In such cases it is necessary to allocate the contribution between the por-
tion sold and the portion remaining in co-ownership to reflect properly the
consideration attributable to the unsold portion.
The Regulations adopt a rather novel approach to the question of
appreciation in value resulting from changes in market value between two
successive contribution dates." This type of fluctuation is termed "gen-
28. Treas Reg. § 25.2515-1(c)(1)(ii) (1958).
29. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(c)(1)(iii) (1958). As to what constitutes a reinvestment,
see Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(2)(ii) (1958) and the text accompanying notes 51 through
53 infra.
30. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(c)(1)(iii) (1958).
31. The Regulations define "successive contribution dates" as the two consecutive
dates on which any contributions to the tenancy are made, although not necessarily by
the same pary. Any appreciation allocable to a specific contribution date will fall into
the same class of consideration as the prior consideration to which it relates. Treas Reg.
§ 25.2515-1(c)(2) (1958).
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eral appreciation." If the general appreciation can be measured readily,
and can be allocated with reasonable certainty to a particular contribution
previously furnished, it will be treated as if it were additional considera-
tion furnished by the person furnishing the prior consideration. General
depreciation is treated in the same manner. 2 Two simple illustrations
will serve to demonstrate the application of these principles:
Example 1. In 1950 H purchases real property for $20,000 and
has title transferred to himself and W, his wife, as tenants by the
entirety. In 1957 the property has appreciated in value to
$50,000, at which time W makes improvements to the prop-
erty in the amount of $10,000. In 1958 the property is sold for
$60,000. The $30,000 general appreciation is attributable to the
original $20,000 consideration furnished by H.
Example 2. In 1955 H and W purchase property conveyed to
them as tenants by the entirety. Of the $25,000 purchase price,
H and W furnish $15,000 and $10,000 respectively. In 1960,
when the fair market value of the property is $30,000, W
makes improvements worth $10,000. In 1962, the property
is sold for $40,000. The general appreciation in value of $5,000
results in an additional contribution by H of $3,000 (15,000/
25,000 X 5,000) and by W of $2,000 (10,000/25,000 X 5.000).
H's total contribution, therefore, is $18,000 (15,000 + 3,000).
W's total contribution is $22,000 (10,000 + 2,000 + 10,000).
However, when the appreciation is very gradual and the contri-
butions are so numerous that the amount allocable to a particular con-
tribution cannnot be ascertained with reasonable certainty, the appre-
ciation in value will be disregarded in determining the respective amounts
of consideration furnished. Such a situation is most likely to exist when,
for example, a mortgage on the property is discharged in monthly install-
ments over a period of many years, while at the same time the value of the
property is slowly appreciating.33
2. VALUE OF THE DONOR'S RETAINED INTEREST
In the event that the donor spouse decides to exercise his election
to treat the creation of ;the tenancy as a gift, the amount of the gift at
that time is equal to the amount of his contribution to the tenancy less
the value of his retained interest. 4
32. Treas Reg. § 25.2515-1(c)(2) (1958).
33. Treas Reg. § 25.2515-1(c)(2) (1958). Tomlinson suggests, however, that an exten-
sion of the "general appreciation" concept to more complicated cases may, in many instances,
bring about a shift of consideration between the parties which will have an effect on gift
valuations. Tomlinson, supra note 26.
34. Treas. Reg. 25.2515-2(b) (1958). Note that this result is identical with the law
prior to 1955. The computations will not be the same in the case of tenancies by the en-
tirety, however, since previous to 1952 different actuarial tables were used. See Ringel,
Federal Estate and Gift Tax Treatment of Tenancies by the Entirety in Florida, 38 FLA. B.J.
122 (1964).
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In this connection, the tax treatment of a gift at creation will differ
according to the differences in local law between a joint tenancy and
tenancy by the entirety. Thus, if under local law either party acting alone
is able to bring about a termination of his or her interest in the property
and destroy the right of survivorship in the other-in short, the case of a
traditional joint tenancy-then the value of the donor's retained interest
is always equal to one-half the value of the property. 5 If, on the other
hand, local law permits each spouse to share in the income and enjoyment
of the property but prohibits either spouse from acting alone to defeat
the right of survivorship in the other-the usual case of a tenancy by the
entirety36 -then the amount of the donor's retained interest must be com-
puted by use of actuarial factors 7 which reflect the attained ages of the
spouses at the time the transaction is effected.38
The reason for such divergent treatment should be obvious. If the
tenancy is severable at any time by one of the spouses acting unilaterally,
he or she will always retain-in actuality as well as in theory-a one-half
interest in the property, regardless of the respective ages of the spouses.
To demonstrate by hyperbole, assume the case of the octogenarian and
his twenty-one year old bride. If they own property as joint tenants and
not as tenants by the entirety, despite the fact that the husband's chances
of outliving his wife are minuscule, he nevertheless may sever the tenancy
tomorrow and destroy his wife's right to survive to the entire property
upon his death. If, on the other hand, the spouses hold title as tenants by
the entirety, the husband may not sever the tenancy and his interest in
the property is only the value of his chances to outlive his wife. Here
then, each spouse has merely a contingent right to the entire property,
the present value of which must be computed on the basis of life expect-
ancies.
In order to determine the value of the donor's retained interest, the
actuarial factor representing the relative ages of the spouses must be
35. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(b)(1) (1958).
36. In Florida, neither spouse acting alone can sever a tenancy by the entirety. An-
drews v. Andrews, 155 Fla. 654, 21 So.2d 205 (1945) ; Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So.
833 (1925). Income from property held by the entirety is also deemed to be the property
of the husband and wife equally. See Dodson v. National Title Ins. Co., 159 Fla. 371, 31
So.2d 402 (1947) ; Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920). Neither
spouse acting alone can defeat the other spouse's right of survivorship in the whole property.
Bailey v. Smith, supra.
For an excellent analysis of § 2515 and its application under Florida property law con-
cepts, see Ringel, Federal Estate and Gilt Tax Treatment of Tenancies by the Entirety in
Florida, 38 FLA. B.J. 122 (1964). See also BOYER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 439-47.
37. These appear in Table IX of the Internal Revenue Service booklet entitled "Actuarial
Tables for Estate and Gift Taxes," IR-Mimeo. No. 54-188, reproduced in 2 CCH FED. EST. &
GnrT TAX REP. 7055-57. However, Table IX applies only when each spouse is entitled to one-
half the rents and profits from the property. Where local law holds that the husband is
entitled to all the use and income from the property under a tenancy by the entirety, Table
XI cannot be used. In such cases, Chapter VI of the booklet explains the method and
proper tables to employ.
38. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(b)(2) (1958).
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multiplied by the value of the entire property. By way of illustration,
suppose that with his own funds H purchases property for $100,000 and
has title conveyed to himself and his wife, W, as tenants by the entirety.
At this time H is 46 and W is 40 years of age, and H elects to treat the
transfer as a gift pursuant to section 2515(a). The appropriate actuarial
factor for the attained ages of the spouses is .43908, and the value of H's
retained interest is therefore $43,908 (.43908 X $100,000). H has made
a gift to W of $56,092 ($100,000 - $43,908) disregarding the annual
exclusion, 39 lifetime specific exemption40 and the gift tax marital deduc-
tion.41 Note, however, that had the transfer been to husband and wife as
joint tenants and not as tenants by the entirety, the value of H's retained
interest in the example above would have been equal to one-half the value
of the property, or $50,000, and a gift in the same amount would have
resulted.
3. MANNER OF ELECTION
Ever since the Revenue Act of 1932, gift tax returns have been re-
quired for any year in which there were gifts of present interests in
property to any one person during any one calendar year of a value more
than the annual exclusion,42 and for gifts of a future interest in property
regardless of the value of the interest.
Section 2515(c) provides that the election to treat the creation of or
addition in value to a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety in real prop-
erty is exercised by including the value of such gifts in the donor's gift tax
return for the calendar year in which the tenancy was created or the addi-
tions in value to the property were made.4" In order to exercise the
election, a gift tax return must be filed, regardless of the fact that the
amount of the gift does not exceed the annual exclusion under section
2503(b). 44 The importance of filing the gift tax return cannot be over-
emphasized, since by failing to do so the donor is prevented later from
exercising the election. As will be seen later,45 there are specific instances
when substantial tax savings may be effected by exercising the election
under section 2515(a).
39. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b).
40. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2521.
41. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2523(d). See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(d) (1958) ; Tom-
linson, Gift Tax Aspects of Entireties, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES 895 (1959). For an explanation
of the gift tax marital deduction as it relates to joint ownership, see 4 RABICIN & JOHNSON,
op. cit. supra note 10; LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 10, at 666.
42. Since 1943 the annual exclusion has been $3,000; from 1939 to 1942 it was $4,000;
prior to 1939 it was $5,000.
43. See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(a) (1958).
44. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2515(c); Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(a) (1958). The need
for gift tax returns is discussed in Ringel, supra note 34. It is important to note that the
ordinary procedure for filing back returns is not available for gifts of real property after
1954, since by failing to file a timely return the taxpayer is precluded from doing so under
the elective procedure. See Ringel, supra.
45. See Section V of this article's text infra.
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B. Gift on Termination of the Tenancy
Section 2515(b) provides that on the termination of a joint tenancy
or tenancy by the entirety other than by the death of one of the spouses,
there will be a gift to the extent that the proportion of the total considera-
tion furnished by a spouse multiplied by the proceeds of termination
exceeds the value of such proceeds of termination received by such spouse.
It should be noted at the very outset that a gift on termination may result
notwithstanding the fact that the contribution of either spouse was elected
for gift treatment under section 2515(a).4
1. HAS THERE BEEN A TERMINATION?
Since section 2515(b) has shifted the impact of the gift tax to the
termination of the tenancy, it is important to ascertain at what moment
the tenancy has been terminated. In general, a termination takes place
when the entire tenancy or a portion thereof is disposed of or changed
in any manner prior to the death of either of the spouses. A "disposition"
for these purposes includes a sale, exchange or other disposition, a con-
veyance by the spouses to themselves as tenants in common, or any other
alteration in the nature of their respective interests in the property
formerly held by them as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety.
4 7
Similarly, an increase in the indebtedness on property held in tenancy
by the entireties will be deemed a termination to the extent of the increase
in indebtedness, and to the extent the increase is not offset by additions to
the tenancy within a reasonable time after -the increase.48 In other words,
if the property is mortgaged to finance additions or improvements to the
property, a termination will not occur so as to require the imposition of a
gift tax at that time. However, to avoid the possibility of accounting for
the same contribution more than once, the additions to the property, to the
extent of the increase in indebtedness, may not be treated as additional
contribution by the spouses.49
As hinted at previously, an exchange will be treated as a disposition
effecting a termination of the tenancy. The Regulations, however, provide
an exception when the property subject to the tenancy is exchanged for
other real property, the title to which is held by the spouses in an identical
tenancy.5 0 A tenancy is considered "identical" if the proportionate values
of the respective rights of the spouses are identical to those in the property
exchanged.
A further exception to the general rule that a sale or other disposition
constitutes a termination exists when the sale, exchange or other disposi-
46. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(1) (1958).
47. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(2)(i) (1958).
48. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(2)(i) (1958).
49. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(2)(i) (1958).
50. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(2)(ii) (1958).
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tion is followed by a reinvestment in other property by the entirety. But
in order to preclude a finding that a termination has occurred the following
three conditions-all of which must be met-are imposed on the reinvest-
ment:
(1) There must be no division of the proceeds of the sale or
other disposition; 1
(2) On or before the date for filing a gift tax return for the year
in which the property is sold the spouses must have entered into
a binding contract for the purchase of other property;" and
(3) After the sale or other disposition, and within a reasonable
time after the contract referred to in (2) has been entered into,
such other real property must actually be acquired and held by
the spouses in an identical tenancy.
2. PROCEEDS OF TERMINATION
The proceeds of termination may be in the form of money, property
or an interest in property. When the proceeds constitute property or an
interest in property, the value will be measured by the fair market value
on the date of termination of the property or property interest in ques-
tion.54 If a tenancy by the entirety is terminated in favor of a tenancy
in common between the spouses, the proceeds of termination received by
each spouse will be the value of one-half the property at the date of ter-
mination.
There is an area likely to cause unintended tax consequences to the
unwary, namely, the termination of a tenancy and a gift of the proceeds to
a third person. The Regulations provide that if, under local law, a tenancy
may be severed without the consent of the other (the joint tenancy situa-
tion), and if one of the tenants does so and makes a gift of his or her
interest to a third person, two gifts may result-a gift to the spouse upon
termination of the tenancy, and a second gift of the proceeds of termina-
tion to the third person. 5 However, when both spouses join in making
to a third person a gift of property held by them as tenants by the en-
tirety, the value of the proceeds considered to be received by each will
be determined by the amount each spouse reports on his or her gift tax
return. 56 The reason for this unusual treatment may be found in section
51. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(2)(ii)(a) (1958). However, the fact that as a matter
of convenience the proceeds of sale are deposited in the name of one or both tenants sepa-
rately or jointly does not violate this provision.
52. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d) (2) (ii) (b) (1958).
53. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(2)(ii)(c) (1958). For purposes of this subdivision, the
Regulations provide that a "reasonable time" is an amount of time which, according to the
facts involved in a particular case, may be needed for those matters incident to the acquisi-
tion of another property, such as the time required for the perfecting of title, arrangement
for financing, and construction.
54. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(3)(i) (1958).
55. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(3)(i) (1958).
56. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(3)(i) (1958),
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2515(b), which contemplates that the spouses may, on termination,
divide the proceeds in a manner unrelated to their respective legal interests
in the property. However, any gift tax savings effected by apportioning
between the spouses the amount of the gift to a third person would appear
to be nullified by a gift between spouses which would arise from a termina-
tion disproportionate to the original ratio of consideration furnished by
the spouses.
3. COMPUTATION OF THE GIFT
Any time after December 31, 1954, when the election under section
2515(a) is not exercised by the donor spouse, there may be a gift upon
termination of the tenancy whenever the proceeds of termination are
divided in a ratio different from the ratio of consideration furnished by
the spouses at the creation of the tenancy. Thus, is each spouse had
furnished one-half the consideration, any unequal distribution of the
proceeds of termination will result in a gift from the spouse receiving
less than half the proceeds to the spouse receiving the larger share. Or,
if one spouse had furnished the entire consideration for the creation of the
tenancy, there will be a taxable gift at termination to the extent that the
non-contributing spouse receives any portion of the proceeds of termina-
tion. Although these rules apply both to joint tenancies and tenancies
by the entirety regardless of the ages of the spouses, they do not apply
unless -the entire consideration for the creation of or addition to the
tenancy was furnished solely by the spouses.
5 7
In order to compute the value of the gift at termination, it is neces-
sary first to determine the share of the proceeds of each spouse attribut-
able to the consideration he or she furnished. This if found by multiplying
the total proceeds of termination by the percentage of consideration con-
tributed by the spouse. The resulting figure defines and delimits the
amount of the proceeds of termination which that spouse may receive
without a gift arising. Any proceeds received in excess of that amount will
result in a gift to the extent of the excess. For example, assume that in
1957 realty is purchased by H and W for $100,000, and that H and W
contributed $70,000 and $30,000, respectively. In 1960 the property is
sold for $200,000 and the proceeds are divided equally. H has made a
gift to W in the amount of $40,000, computed as follows:
$ 70,000 (consideration furnished by H alone) X $200,000
$100,000 (total consideration furnished)
- $140,000 (share to which H is entitled)
$140,000 - $100,000 (proceeds received by H)
= $ 40,000 (amount of gift from H to W). 8
57. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-3(a)(2) (1958).
58. See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-3(c) Example (1) (1958). A similar example was
suggested by the Senate Committee. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 481 (1954).
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Note that in the above example, had H received a portion of the proceeds
of termination in an amount greater than $140,000, he would have re-
ceived a gift from W to -the extent of the excess.
The same principles are applicable when a tenancy is terminated
in part only. The only difference is that the percentage of contribution by
the donor spouse will be multiplied by the proceeds of the partial termi-
nation, and the amount of gift will be determined by subtracting from that
amount the value of the proceeds received by the donor spouse. 9 As to the
portion of the property remaining in joint tenancy or tenancy by the en-
tirety, the ratio established by the original contributions of each spouse
will govern the portion of the tenancy not terminated in order to determine
the amount of consideration furnished for the remaining tenancy.
4. GIFT ON TERMINATION WHEN CREATION WAS TREATED AS A GIFT
OR WHEN CONSIDERATION WAS FURNISHED BY A THIRD PERSON
As mentioned previously, the fact that the donor has exercised his
election under section 2515(a) to treat the creation of the tenancy as a
gift will not, in itself, preclude a later finding of a second gift as the result
of the termination of the tenancy. However, the rules which govern the
computation of the amount of gift when there has been no previous elec-
tion or when the consideration has been furnished solely by the spouses
do not apply when there has been an election to treat the creation of the
tenancy as a gift or when all or part of the consideration for the creation
of the tenancy has been furnished by a third person.
If the entire consideration for the creation of the tenancy was treated
as a gift under section 2515 (a), or if it was contributed by a third person,
a gift will arise to one of the spouses to the extent that his or her retained
interest in the property is exceeded by the proceeds of termination re-
ceived by such spouse.6" In the case of a joint tenancy, the retained interest
of each spouse is equal to one-half the value of the property. In the case
of a tenancy by the entirety, actuarial factors similar to those used to
compute a spouse's retained interest for the purpose of determining the
existence of a gift upon the creation of a tenancy will be used to determine
the value of the gift on termination, except that the attained ages of
the spouses on termination will be used. The application of these principles
may be illustrated by the following example:
H furnishes the entire consideration of $100,000 for the creation
of a tenancy by the entirety in the names of H and W. The crea-
tion of the tenancy is treated as a gift (either because the donor
elected to do so after December 31, 1954 or because the tenancy
was created prior to that time). In 1964, when H is 55 and W is
59. For an example of the operation of this principle, see Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-3(c)
Example (2) (1958).
60. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-4(b) (1958).
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48 years of age, the property is sold for $200,000 and the pro-
ceeds distributed equally. The appropriate actuarial factor is
.41285. Therefore, the value of H's retained interest is $82,570
(200,000 X .41285). In this case, W has made a gift to H in the
amount of $17,430, or $100,000 (amount received by H at termi-
nation) -$82,570 (value of H's retained interest).
The problem of computation becomes increasingly complex as the
type of consideration furnished becomes mixed. In order to compute the
amount of the gift which arises upon the termination of a tenancy for
which two types of consideration have been furnished, it is necessary
first to separate the total consideration furnished into two distinct types:
(1) that furnished solely by the spouses and not treated as a gift, and
(2) that furnished by a third person or furnished by the spouses and
treated as a gift. The value of the gift then may be computed according
to the following steps:61
(a) By finding the ratio of Type (1) consideration to the total
consideration furnished and multiplying this fraction by the
proceeds of termination. This amount represents the portion of
the proceeds of termination attributable to the consideration
furnished solely by the spouses and not treated as a gift in the
year of creation;
(b) By multiplying the amount arrived at in (a) above by the
proportion of Type (1) consideration furnished by one of the
spouses. This represents the portion of the proceeds of termina-
tion attributable to Type (1) consideration furnished by one of
the spouses;
(c) By subtracting from the total proceeds of termination the
portion of the proceeds attributable to Type (1) consideration,
i.e., (a) above. This represents the proceeds attributable to Type
(2) consideration;
(d) By multiplying (c) above by the appropriate actuarial
factor representing the spouse's retained interest and by adding
the product to the result of the calculation under step (b)
above. This figure represents the interest of that spouse in the
proceeds of termination attributable to both types of considera-
tion furnished.
(e) From the sum produced by step (d) above is subtracted the
amount of the proceeds of termination received by the spouse.
This figure represents the value of the gift from one spouse to
the other.
The application of the above principles may be illustrated as follows:
61. The various levels of computation are set forth in more or less obscure detail in
Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2515-4(c)to-(d) (1958)1. The explanation given by this writer in the
text is an attempt to clarify and simplify the treatment under the Regulations.
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Assume that in 1950 D died, devising realty worth $100,000 to H and
W as tenants by the entirety. In 1955, when the market value of the
property was still $100,000, improvements in the amount of $50,000
were made, for which H and W furnished $40,000 and $10,000 considera-
tion, respectively. The addition was not treated as a gift by H. In 1964
the property is sold for $300,000 and the proceeds divided equally between
H and W. At this time H and W are 46 and 40 years of age respectively.
The value of the gift made by H to W is $17,816, computed as follows:
(a) $ 50,000 (Type (1) consideration) X $300,000 (proceeds
$150,000 (Total consideration) of termination)
= $100,000
(b) $ 40,000 (Type (1) consideration fur-
nished by H)
$ 50,000 (Total Type (1) consideration)
= $ 80,000
(c) $300,000 (Total proceeds of termination)
-100,000 (Proceeds attributable to Type (1) considera-
tion)
$200,000 (Proceeds attributable to Type (2) considera-
tion)
(d) $200,000 X .43908 = $ 87,816 (H's retained interest in
the proceeds)
$ 87,816 (H's retained interest)
80,000 (H's portion of proceeds attributable to Type
(1) consideration)
$167,816 (Proceeds to which H is entitled)
(e) $167,816
-150,000 (proceeds actually received by H)
$ 17,816 (amount of gift from H to W) 2
The same sequence of computations would be used in the case of a joint
tenancy, except that a factor of one-half would be substituted in the
above example in place of the actuarial factor.
C. Caveat: The Taxable Divorce
Although neither the Code nor the Regulations make specific refer-
ence to it, probably the most frequently occurring taxable "termination"
is brought about when a tenancy by the entirety is "converted" to a ten-
ancy in common as the result of a divorce. Since the tenancy by the
entirety owes its existence to the presence of the fifth unity of marriage,
whenever that unity ceases to exist the tenancy by the entirety is auto-
matically terminated. Under general principles of property law, the
62. This example appears, with slight modifications, in the Regulations. Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2515-4(d) (1958).
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former spouses will hold the property as tenants in common following a
divorce."3 The Regulations promulgated under section 2515 provide
expressly that when a tenancy by the entirety is terminated so that there-
after each spouse owns an undivided one-half interest as tenant in com-
mon, each spouse will be deemed to have received an amount equal to one-
half the value of the property at the time the tenancy is terminated.
64
Thus, when the creation of the tenancy was not treated as a gift under
section 2515 (a) and the consideration for the property's acquisition was
not furnished equally by the spouses, a gift will result upon the "con-
version" into a tenancy in common upon divorce.65
If, on the other hand, the election under section 2515(a) had been
exercised at the time the property was acquired or when additions in
value or reductions in indebtedness were made with respect to the prop-
erty, no further gift tax liability will be incurred at -the time the spouses
are divorced, except to the extent their ages differ. This result is consistent
with the prior law. 6 Indeed, perhaps the apparent nonchalance of many
attorneys to the possibility of gift tax liability upon divorce stems from
the fact that the prior law was so clearly to the effect that no gift was
made between spouses when a tenancy by the entirety was severed in
favor of a tenancy in common. The reason for this treatment under the
prior law may be found in the fact that prior to 1955 it was the creation
of the tenancy which met with a gift tax; consequently, upon the termina-
tion of the tenancy by the entirety a gift would result only when the ages
of the spouses were not the same. With the advent of the elective proce-
dure under the 1954 Code, however, the tax burden was shifted from the
creation to the termination of the tenancy, negating the reason for the
previous rule.
Further, in view of the clear language of the Regulations, there
63. The Florida statute is fairly representative of this basic rule. FLA. STAT. § 689.15
(1963). See also Quick v. Leatherman, 96 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1957); Reid v. Reid, 68 So.2d
821 (Fla. 1953) ; Valentine v. Valentine, 45 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1950) ; Andrews v. Andrews, 155
Fla. 654, 21 So.2d 205 (1945).
64. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(3)(i) (1958). There is also general language to the
effect that a termination of the tenancy is effected when the spouses, through any form of
conveyance or agreement, become tenants in common of the property. Treas. Reg
§ 25.2515-1(d)(2)(i) (1958).
65. The computation of the gift is treated in section IV(B) (3) of this article's text supra.
66. Special Ruling, October 1, 1948, 1 CCH FED. EST. & Gur TAx REP. ff 3200.915
provides:
The conversion of a tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common is not a
taxable gift, if the spouses are the same age. If their ages differ, the transfer is tax-
able as a gift from the younger to the older to the extent of the value of the rights
of the younger under the tenancy by the entirety less one-half the value of the
property. The valuations are based on the Actuaries' or Combined Experience Table
of Mortality.
The same conclusion was suggested in cases involving the estate taxation of gifts in con-
templation of death, where it was necessary again to determine whether a "gift" was made
upon the "conversion" into a tenancy in common. Rickenberg v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d
114 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 (1949); Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175
F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949).
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would appear to be no reason to suspect that a conversion into a tenancy
in common via the divorce route should receive, or was intended by the
Service to receive, a treatment any different from that which is involved
in an amicable conversion into a tenancy in common-a termination
which clearly involves a transfer for gift tax purposes.
It should be noted that what is involved is more than simply the
gift tax liability of the donor spouse. To the extent that transferee
liability 7 may attach to the donee and subsequent purchasers, the problem
becomes less parochial and the title examiner's job waxes more compli-
cated. Therefore, whenever a post-1954 purchase of property by the
entirety and a divorce appear in the chain of title, the possibility of a
federal gift tax lien should be considered.
On the other hand, it seems equally clear that a second taxable gift
does not occur when the husband's half of the newly-created tenancy in
common is transferred to his former wife as lump sum alimony, either
pursuant to an agreement or decree of the divorce court. Section 2516
exempts from the domain of the gift tax a transfer of property or of an
interest in property made under the terms of a written agreement be-
tween the spouses in settlement of their marital rights or to provide a
reasonable support allowance for the issue of their marriage, provided
that a divorce in fact occurs within two years after the agreement is
executed. However, it is not necessary that such an agreement be incorpo-
rated into the divorce decree or that the transfers exempted under the
statute be made within any time limit,68 as long as the divorce itself
occurs within two years after the execution of the agreement.
Even in the absence of a previous agreement, when the husband
transfers his half of the new tenancy in common to the wife as lump sum
alimony pursuant only to the decree of divorce, the -transfer is held to be
involuntary and hence is outside the limits of the gift tax.69 Even when
there is an agreement between the spouses which is contingent upon the
entry of a decree of divorce, the transfer will be treated as involuntary and
not subject to the gift tax as long as the court is vested with power to de-
cree a settlement differing from the previous agreement.
70
67. The donee is personally liable to the extent of the value of the gift, for the amount
of gift tax unpaid by the donor for the calendar year in which the gift was made. The tax
is a lien upon the gift for ten years from the time the gift was made. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 6324(b). See also Ekman, Tax Consequences of Tenancies by the Entirety and
Joint Tenancies, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAx 291, 299-300 (1955).
68. LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIF TAXES 658, 692 (2d ed. 1962).
69. Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950). E.T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 166 pro-
vides that property transfers incident to divorce or legal separation, to the extent made in
satisfaction of rights of support, are made for adequate consideration and hence are not
subject to the imposition of gift tax liability. For an extensive treatment of this question,
see Taylor, Effect of Property Settlements Incident to Divorce, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED.
TAx 305 (1955).
70. Commissioner v. Watson, 216 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1954); McMurty v. Commissioner,
203 F.2d. 659 (1st Cir. 1953), reversing 16 T.C. 168 (1951) ; Florida Nat'l Bank & Trust
1964]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Although property held by husband and wife in joint tenancy rather
than by the entirety is not subject to the automatic "conversion" into a
tenancy in common upon the divorce of the spouses, as a practical matter
it is usually undesirable to continue the survivorship feature once the
marriage has been dissolved. However, if by choice, the spouses decide
to terminate the joint tenancy in favor of a tenancy in common, a gift
will result to the same extent as in the case of a conversion of a tenancy
by the entirety by operation of law. Moreover, in either case the gift
tax marital deduction would be unavailable. In such situations, proper
planning can insure the avoidance of gift tax consequences through a
disposition of the property and division of the proceeds in exact propor-
tion to the original contributions furnished by the spouses. Any subse-
quent property settlement, involving either the proceeds of termination
of the joint tenancy or some other property, could then be made without
incurring a gift tax on the transfer, whether pursuant to a divorce decree
or an agreement satisfying the requirements of section 2516.
The same remedial steps also may be taken with respect to property
held as a tenancy by the entirety. In this situation, however, gift tax
consequences will be avoided only if the tenancy is destroyed prior to a
divorce and the proceeds are divided according to the original contribu-
tion ratios, since at the moment of divorce the division automatically
is made on an equal basis by virtue of the conversion into a tenancy in
common.
It is submitted that a divorce is an event unpleasant enough in itself
to need no further complication in the form of a gift tax. Therefore, it
would seem incumbent upon the attorney, when he sits down with the
parties to discuss the various means of effectuating a fair property settle-
ment, to give serious consideration to the severance of any tenancies by
the entirety before a divorce decree is entered.
V. SHOULD THE ELECTION BE EXERCISED?
At first glance, it would appear that section 2515(a) offers to the
taxpayer an election which only a fool would choose to exercise. However,
a closer examination reveals that in a few specific instances a valuable
tax advantage is available in the form of the elective procedure.
Co. v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Fla. 1960); Rev. Rul. 60-160, 1960-1 CuM.
BULL. 374; Rev. Rul. 54-29, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 186. See also LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit.
supra note 68, at 691. Under this view, when the court has the power to decree a different
settlement from that which the spouses have provided for by their agreement, the court's
adoption of the agreement is considered as an expression by it of the appropriate division of
the property, rather than as the mere enforcement of the agreement. This reasoning renders
the subsequent transfer an involuntary transfer pursuant to order of court, rather than a
voluntary transfer pursuant to agreement. However, if the court lacks this modifying power,
a division in conformity with the agreement is simply the enforcement of the agreement
and not an involuntary transfer; hence, it will be taxable as a gift. See LowunDs & KRAMER,
supra, at 691.
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In the years immediately following the enactment of section 2515,
it was felt by some writers that the gift tax election was a useless provi-
sion doomed to extinction from the very beginning, and that consequently
it would be ignored by the taxpayer. At least one writer7 based his prog-
nostication on the fact that the exercise or non-exercise of the election
would have no bearing on the inclusion of the entire property in the gross
estate of the donor should he die first; consequently, it was reasoned,
payment of a gift tax would be a waste. This reasoning, perhaps more
naive than considered, at least points out the cardinal rule governing
the exercise of the election under section 2515(a): the election should
never be exercised if husband and wife plan to continue the tenancy until
one of them dies. In such a situation, it is truly a waste to choose to pay
a gift tax when there is no corresponding estate tax reduction. If no elec-
tion is made and later one of the spouses dies, no gift tax will be payable
at any time, although an estate tax-which was inevitable even if the
election had been exercised-will be forthcoming.
Further, the option to defer the taxable event would preserve some
excellent tax-avoiding opportunities. If, for example, income-producing
property which under local law entitles the wife to one-half of the income
is transferred by the husband to himself and his wife jointly, non-exercise
of the election enables the same income-splitting without gift tax conse-
quences. Moreover, the income drained off to the wife will be hers abso-
lutely and hence not includible in her husband's gross estate upon his
death, even though the value of the income-producing property will be
includible. 72
On the other hand, there are instances when it is a distinct tax ad-
vantage to elect to treat the creation of the tenancy as a gift. One such
situation occurs when the spouses contemplate a termination of the
tenancy during their lives and a division of the proceeds at a time when
the property is expected to have appreciated substantially in value. In
such event, it would be desirable to exercise the election at the creation of
the tenancy, whether the property is owned in joint tenancy or by the
entirety. Consider the following examples:
Example 1. In 1955 H furnishes the entire consideration of
$100,000 for the purchase of Blackacre, taking title in the names
of H and W as joint tenants. H does not elect to treat the crea-
tion as a gift. In 1964, the tenancy is terminated by a sale of the
property for $300,000, and the proceeds are divided equally
between H and W. H has made a gift to W of $150,000, the
extent of the proceeds received by W, since H furnished the en-
tire consideration.
71. Ekman, supra note 67, at 297.
72. BOWE, ESTATE PLANNING 182 (1957). See also Alexander, Joint and Survivorship
Property, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 75 (1959).
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Example 2. Assume the same facts as in Example 1 above, ex-
cept that H elected to treat the creation of the tenancy as a gift.
At that time H's retained interest was equal to one-half the value
of the property, or $50,000. Therefore, at creation H is deemed
to have made a $50,000 gift to W ($100,000 - $50,000). At the
termination of the tenancy in 1964, H has received $150,000, or
exactly the value of his retained interest in the property. Conse-
quently, no further gift has been made at termination. The
total gift is $50,000, as opposed to a gift of $150,000 in Example
1.
Example 3. Assume the same facts as in Example 1 except that
in 1955 H furnishes the entire consideration and takes title in the
names H and W as tenants by the entirety, with no right of sever-
ance in either spouse. In 1955, H is 50 years of age and W is
45. The consideration for the purchase was furnished solely by
the spouses (in this case, by H alone). If no election is exercised
at that time, the amount of the gift from H to W at termination
equals $150,000, as in Example 1.
Example 4. Assume the same facts as in Example 3, except that
instead H elects to treat the creation of the tenancy as a gift.
The value of H's retained interest in 1955 is $44,284 ($100,000
X .44284) and in that year he has made a gift to W of $55,716
(100,000 - 44,284). Later, when the tenancy is terminated in
1964 and each spouse receives one-half the proceeds, there will
be a second gift-this time from W to H. H's retained interest
in 1964 is equal to $129,015 (300,000 X .43005) and the amount
of the gift from W to H is $20,985 (150,000 - 129,015). The
total gift between spouses at creation and termination is equal
to $65,269-considerably less than the $150,000 gift when the
election was not exercised.
In one other situation it will be desirable for the owner to exercise
the gift tax election upon the creation of the tenancy and upon any addi-
tions in value thereto. This situation involves the purchase of property
by making a small cash payment and giving back a mortgage that may be
discharged in such a way as to nullify the possible gift tax liability
through the use of the gift tax marital deduction and annual exclusion.
This principle may be illustrated by the following example: 73
In 1955 H purchases Blackacre in joint tenancy with his wife W,
paying $12,000 cash and incurring an indebtedness of $48,000
payable at the rate of $12,000 a year. H furnishes the entire con-
sideration for the original $12,000 payment and each subsequent
reduction in indebtedness, and elects to treat them all as gifts to
his wife of one-half, or $6,000. Five years later when the prop-
erty is free and clear, it is sold to a third person for $100,000.
No gift tax whatsoever would have been incurred at any time
73. BOWE, op. cit. supra note 72, at 182-83.
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prior to termination, despite that fact that H exercised his elec-
tion each time, since each $6,000 gift from H to W was consumed
exactly by the gift tax marital deduction of $3,000 and by the
$3,000 annual exclusion. On termination, there is a gift from H
to W only to the extent W receives more than half the proceeds.
A similar, though not identical, result would obtain if the property were
purchased by H and placed in a tenancy by the entirety, except that a
slight gift would result in excess of the marital deduction and annual ex-
clusion to the extent the ages of the spouses differed. Note, however, that
in either case, if no election had been made either at the creation of the
tenancy or at the subsequent reductions in indebtedness, a gift would have
resulted to the extent that W received any portion of the proceeds of
termination.
In the case of property with a higher purchase price, it may be
possible to extend the indebtedness over a longer period so that each
anuual reduction is no greater than $12,000. Although a larger cash
payment may be required in many cases, the gift tax marital deduction
will increase proportionately, minimizing to some extent the balance which
is not consumed by the annual exclusion. In any event, the gift tax conse-
quences are far less severe than they might be when the section 2515(a)
election is not exercised and the gift is postponed until the termination
of the tenancy.
As pointed out previously, 'the election is lost unless it is exercised
in accordance with the procedures prescribed by section 2515 (c) and the
Regulations 74 thereunder. It is therefore crucial that a husband and wife
be advised at the time they create the tenancy of the possible advantages
of exercising -the election at that time. This is especially pertinent infor-
mation if the property is being purchased as a speculative venture in con-
templation of a substantial appreciation in value in the future. It is the
duty of the attorney, therefore, to determine at the outset the nature
of the property to be purchased, the purpose of the undertaking and the
future plans which the spouses entertain with respect to the property.
Finally, the spouses should be made aware of the gift tax savings which
may be accomplished through a farsighted plan of financing which makes
the maximum use of the gift tax marital deduction and annual exclusion.
VI. CONCLUSION
At this point it should be apparent that if there are advantages inci-
dent to the concurrent form of ownership, they are not to be located
within the confines of the Internal Revenue Code. Although the man
whose entire estate is owned with his wife jointly may be able to avoid
estate taxes entirely should he be "fortunate" enough not to be wealthy,
74. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(a) (1958).
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he may not be so fortunate when it comes time to side-step the gift taxes
incurred as the result of joint ownership. And in the case of the man with
an estate large enough to be subject to an estate tax, joint ownership is
almost always a needless means of maximizing, rather than minimizing,
the bite of estate taxes. Moreover, the estate tax burden weighs most
heavily on the estate of the surviving spouse, who is left without the
mitigating effect of the marital deduction. Perhaps the most fitting testi-
monial to the joint ownership device is the fact that in order to avoid the
estate tax consequences by way of a termination of the tenancy, the re-
prieve is accomplished often only at the expense of a gift tax. Ironically,
even when this method is chosen, purgation may be less than complete if
the termination takes place within three years of the death of one of the
tenants.
75
If any generalizations may be justified, it seems safe to assert that
joint ownership should be avoided unless the non-tax considerations are
so weightly as to render the tax consquences trivial in comparison. Cer-
tainly, the desire to avoid probate is not alone a sufficient justification
for owning property jointly, since the same result may be accomplished
by other more tax-favorable devices, such as the inter vivos trust, life
insurance or the family annuity. Moreover, the person who chooses joint
ownership in contemplation of serious difficulties with his creditors
should consider the extent to which he will compromise his loved ones
after death in order to evade his enemies during his lifetime.
Clearly, the most satisfactory solution to the joint ownership prob-
lem is to avoid the problem before it arises, by choosing to own and
dispose of property in some other manner. However, once the harm has
been done, the most innocuous remedy from the tax point of view may be
effected by transferring the property to the spouses individually in pro-
portion to the ratio of consideration each has furnished for the acquisi-
tion of the property. This may be achieved either by a partition of the
property, a sale and division of the proceeds or by conversion into a ten-
ancy in common when each spouse has furnished the consideration equally
(and in the case of tenancy by the entirety whose creation was treated as
a gift, when both spouses are the same age). In the great majority of
cases, this procedure will involve a transfer of the entire property or
proceeds back to the husband. From this point, he may begin his estate
plan anew, with an emphasis on more desirable planning vehicles.
75. This problem is beyond the present scope of this article. For an excellent ap-
praisal of the conceptual "fork in the road" the courts appear to have reached-property
law versus tax interest concepts-see Comment, 61 MicH. L. REV. 1335 (1963). See also
Polasky, Current Tax Developments, Including Joint and Widow's Election, 103 TausTs
& ESTATES 253 (1964); Stacy, Joint Tenancy in Estate Planning Can Have Serious Tax
Disadvantages, 20 J. TAXATiON 98 (1964); Note, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 430 (1962).
For a graphic demonstration of the disadvantages of joint ownership, see the cases of
"Mr. and Mrs. B" and "Mr. and Mrs. C" in Doherty, Joint Tenancy--Objectives v. Results,
37 TRUsT BULL. 9 (1958).
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VII. EPILOGUE
A few potential problems still remain as the aftermath of the remedial
transfers described above. First, the creation of the tenancy may have
been -treated as a gift and a gift tax paid-either because section 2515(a)
did not apply or because the election under that section was exercised.
If such is the case, the transfer of the entire property or proceeds of a sale
to the husband who furnished the entire consideration results in two
needless gifts-from husband to wife of a one-half interest and from wife
to husband of the same interest-without a change of ownership in the
end.
Second, if the donee wife should die within three years of the transfer
back to the donor husband, there is the possibility of a transfer in con-
templation of death, causing at least one-half of the value of the property
-and possibly all of it"6-to be includible in the wife's estate for federal
estate tax purposes, a danger which might have been avoided by the
husband's outright ownership of the property in the first instance. Al-
though the estate tax marital deduction and credit for gift taxes paid may
provide some measure of partial relief, it is clear that an unnecessary
estate tax may nevertheless be incurred.
76. Because the courts have not yet decided whether the property law concept or the
tax interest concept is to govern the contemplation of death problem, the amount to be
includible in the wife's estate, at least when the property is held by the entirety, is open
to speculation at this time. See note 75 supra.
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